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I.

INTRODUCTION

7KH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQV LQ McGirt v. Oklahoma and Sharp v. Murphy
constitute a resounding vindication of the bedrock principles of federal Indian law that
WUDFH WKHLU RULJLQ WR &KLHI -XVWLFH 0DUVKDOO¶V IRXQGDWLRQDO WULORJ\ namely, that the
sovereign rights of tribal governments remain intact unless and until Congress explicitly
SURYLGHV RWKHUZLVH QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJ WKH HURVLYH IRUFHV RI KLVWRU\ RU WKH ³VHWWOHG
H[SHFWDWLRQV´ RI QRQ-Indian communities.1 This essay does not attempt to locate the
&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQVZLWKLQWKHEURDGHUFDQRQRIIHGHUDO,QGLDQODZRUWRFRPPHQWRQWKH
* Riyaz Kanji, David Giampetroni, and Philip Tinker are attorneys with Kanji & Katzen, PLLC, a firm dedicated
to protecting and enhancing the sovereignty and vitality of Indian nations and their members. The firm
represented the Muscogee (Creek) Nation in both Sharp v. Murphy and McGirt v. Oklahoma, briefing and arguing
the status of Muscogee (Creek) Reservation before the United States Supreme Court, and represented the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation and Seminole Nation of Oklahoma in briefing and argument before the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Murphy v. Royal.
1. 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020); 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020).
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SUDFWLFDO FRQVHTXHQFHV RI WKH &RXUW¶V UHFRJQLWLRQ WKDW WKH 0XVFRJHH &UHHN  1DWLRQ
retains its treaty-protected rights to exercise sovereignty over its eastern Oklahoma
Reservation. Those topics are well covered elsewhere in this Journal. This essay aspires to
a more modest task, that of recounting some of the experiences of the Nation and the
diverse coalition that supported its tireless efforts to protect its historic rights, efforts that
FXOPLQDWHGLQ-XVWLFH*RUVXFK¶VRSLQLRQLQMcGirt.
II.

LAYING THE GROUNDWORK

7KHVWRU\RIWKH&UHHN1DWLRQ¶VYLFWRU\GDWHVEDFNWRWKH1DWLRQ¶VUHPRYDOWRZKDW
is now the State of Oklahoma from its historic homelands in the American southeast under
the auspices of the Indian Removal Act of 1830.2 It is the story RIWKH1DWLRQ¶VHIIRUWWR
preserve the rights guaranteed to it under 1832 and 1833 removal treaties 3 against nearoverwhelming historical forces operating in opposition to those rights; and of its fight to
retain those rights through the trauma of removal, the waves of settlers and speculators
that soon crashed over their new land, its eventual allotment, and of course the creation of
the State of Oklahoma in the early 1900s. And it is the story of the Creeks thereafter
struggling to preserve their government and the strength of their community throughout
the twentieth century, the vast majority of which saw the federal and state governments
and their non-Indian citizens acting as though those rights, and indeed the Nation itself,
had been terminated.
ThiVHVVD\SLFNVXSWKHVWRU\¶VWKUHDGYHU\ODWHLQWKHJDPH,QWKHIDOORID
IXWXUH PHPEHU RI WKH 1DWLRQ¶V Murphy and McGirt case team was then a 2L at the
University of Tulsa College of Law, and in need of a topic for a law review note to submit
to this Journal. He stumbled upon a pair of then federal District Court cases that questioned
the status of two tribal reservations in eastern Oklahoma, reservations which, according to
all conventional wisdom at the time, had long since vanished. 4 One of these cases was
brought by the Osage Nation as a test case, an affirmative bid to re-establish its long
dormant Reservation rights. The other was brought by a member of the Muscogee (Creek)
Nation seeking to avoid the death penalty for a gruesome murder committed within the
boundaries of the historic Creek Reservation.
The resulting student note focused on the three-step Solem disestablishment test and
concluded that the eastern Oklahoma reservations had never been abolished under it. 5 It
was the first Quixotic VWHSLQLWVDXWKRU¶VODZVFKRROMRXUQH\ZLWKWKHMurphy case. After
the article was written but before its publication, the author attended his first Federal Indian
Bar Association conference. There he encountered a number of like-minded law students
from across Indian country who were equally confident that the eastern Oklahoma
reservations had not been terminated by Congress under the Solem analysis. They were
also equally and delightfully oblivious to the conventional wisdom that bad facts make

2. 4 Stat. 411 (1830).
3. Treaty with The Creeks, Mar. 24, 1832, 7 Stat. 366; Treaty with The Creeks, Feb. 14, 1833, 7 Stat 417.
4. See 2VDJH1DWLRQY2NOD7D[&RPP¶Q, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D. Okla. 2009); Murphy v. Sirmons,
497 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (E.D. Okla. 2007).
5. See Philip Tinker, Is Oklahoma Still Indian Country? Reservation Disestablishment in Murphy v.
Sirmons and Osage Nation v. Irby, 9 DARTMOUTH L.J. 120 (2011).
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bDG ODZ DQG WKDW WKH DFFXPXODWHG ZHLJKW RI ³VHWWOHG H[SHFWDWLRQV´ DQG DVVXPSWLRQV
regarding the consequences of Reservation status for entrenched non-Indian interests
suggested that no prudent lawyer should waste their time tilting at this particular
windmill.6
The student group made contact with federal public defender Patty Palmer Ghezzi,
who represented Patrick Murphy in his federal habeas corpus action, and would continue
WR GR VR WKURXJK WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW SURFHHGLQJV LQ 0U 0XUSK\¶V FDVH 7KH VWXGHQWs
provided Ms. Ghezzi²an outstanding lawyer with substantial background in federal
Indian law and its frequently contested application in Oklahoma²with (possibly overenthusiastic and unsolicited) legal research and consultation regarding the issues
implicDWHG E\ 0U 0XUSK\¶V DSSHDO +RZHYHU 0U 0XUSK\¶V FDVH ODQJXLVKHG LQ
procedural limbo for many years after these initial efforts, as the reservation issue took a
back seat to other substantive and procedural criminal law issues also presented by the
matter. The delay proved critical. For it meant that, although the Oklahoma Court of
&ULPLQDO$SSHDOVKDGUHMHFWHG0U0XUSK\¶V,QGLDQFRXQWU\DUJXPHQWVLQDQGWKH
Eastern District of Oklahoma had affirmed that decision in 2007, the issue would not reach
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit before the Supreme Court decided
Nebraska v. Parker nearly a decade later in 2016.7
III. NEBRASKA V. PARKER
Parker was a game-changer with respect to the Solem disestablishment analysis.8
Parker affirmed the continued existence of a disputed portion of the Omaha Reservation
GHVSLWH WKDW WKH 7ULEH¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ RYHU WKDW WHUULWRU\ KDG ORQJ ODLQ GRUPDQW DQG ZDV
DVVXPHGQRWWRH[LVWE\6WDWHDQGIHGHUDORIILFLDOVDQGWKHDUHD¶VQRQ-Indian population.9
,Q IDFW LQ WKH &RXUW¶V ZRUGV ³WKH 7ULEH ZDV DOPRVW HQWLUHO\ DEVHQW IURP WKH GLVSXWHG
WHUULWRU\ IRU PRUH WKDQ  \HDUV´ DQG IHGHUDO RIILFLDOV ³WUHDWHG WKH GLVSXWHG ODQG DV
1HEUDVND¶V´10
Parker¶V importance cannot be overstated. In the decades since Solem, federal
courts, including the Supreme Court, had been drifting from Solem¶VVWHS-one emphasis
RQ&RQJUHVV¶VLQWHQWDVHYLGHQFHGLQVWDWXWRU\WH[WWRZDUGLWVVWHS-three emphasis on the
³MXVWLILDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQVRIWKHSHRSOHOLYLQJLQWKHDUHD´11 TKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQ
City of Sherrill, while not technically a disestablishment case, was appearing in
GLVHVWDEOLVKPHQW FDVHV WR MXVWLI\ JLYLQJ ³KHDY\ ZHLJKW´ WR VXFK H[SHFWDWLRQV DW VWHSthree.12 Parker²authored by Justice Thomas for a unanimous Court²seemed intended
to halt that drift (at least in the disestablishment context) and direct the analysis back

6. During the ensuing decade, far too many individuals contributed to the author¶s Quixotic quest to be able
to list here. In the beginning, the core group came primarily from the University of Tulsa, University of Arizona,
and Arizona State University and included Jasen Chadwick, Kevin Heade, Michael Corey Hinton, William
Patrick Kincaid, Joe Keene, Brian Lewis, and Tonya Thurman.
7. 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421 (1994).
12. See, e.g., Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117, 1128 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Sherrill).
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toward the textual emphasis of Solem¶VVWHSRQH13 The Court emphasized that Congress
must act directly and speak clearly in order to disestablish a reservation, with several
passages in the opinion sending a strong signal to the lower courts that, when it comes to
determining the modern-day existence and scope of tribal rights, it is congressional intent,
as discerned through the interpretive tools of textualism, that rules the day, and that an
absence of clear language terminating tribal rights cannot be overcome by post-hoc
analysis of the actions or settled expectations of governmental actors and non-Indian
interest holders.14
Parker, in short, breathed new life into the previously fanciful notion that the federal
courts might look past a century of conventional wisdom and hold that long dormant
reservation borders like those of the Five Tribes can remain intact if no statute or treaty
has explicitly terminated them, notwithstanding the effects that this renewed recognition
might have on State and local governments or on non-Indian interests in the reservation
WHUULWRU\,WZDVWKHUHIRUHRIJUHDWPRPHQWWKDW3DWULFN0XUSK\¶VFDVHZDVQot released
from its decade of procedural limbo, and put back on track for briefing at the Tenth Circuit,
until January of 2016, which meant that Parker, issued in May of that same year, would
weigh heavily in the future of the case.
In light of Parker, the Creek Nation and other Five Tribes tribal governments began
to focus attention on the Murphy case with a sense of cautious optimism. Shortly after the
decision issued, the Creek Nation and the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma decided to submit
an amicus brief in the Tenth Circuit arguing that the treaty rights that established and
protected the Creek Reservation remained intact because Congress had not taken the
legislative steps necessary to terminate those rights.15
At this point the first leg of the Quixotic journey was complete, and what started as
a pie-in-the-VN\DUJXPHQWLQD/¶VODZUHYLHZQRWHKDGEHFRPHDFUHGLEOHELGWRYLQGLFDWH
the continued existence of the Creek Reservation.
IV. THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Briefing the case for the Tenth Circuit presented a number of challenges. This essay
highlights two of them, the first one strategic or doctrinal, and the second practical. These
two challenges required the legal team to thread a delicate needle, making the most
forceful case possible that the Creek Reservation had not been terminated, without
stepping on the looming landmines, which may have provided justifications for a hesitant
Court to conclude that the tribal position was either foreclosed by Circuit precedent,
subject to a procedural bar, or simply incompatible with the weight of the historical
expectations and assumptions that these lands had long ago been stripped of any vestiges
of the former reservation boundaries.
A. Threading the Needle
A major strategic question was how to address Parker in terms of its impact on
13. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072.
14. Id.
15. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma, Murphy
v. Royal, 866 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2017) (No. 07-7068).
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existing case-ODZ7KLVZDVDFULWLFDOLVVXHRQPXOWLSOHOHYHOV)LUVW0U0XUSK\¶VIHGHUDO
habeas corpus challenge arose under the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1995.16 This law generally precludes federal courts from overturning a State court
FRQYLFWLRQXQOHVVWKDWFRQYLFWLRQZDV³FRQWUDU\WRRULQYROYHGDQXQUHDVRQDEOHDSSOLFDWLRQ
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
6WDWHV´17 If the Tribal Amici had taken the position that Parker dramatically revised the
law of reservation diminishment and overturned prior precedent, this could have led the
Court to find that regardless of whether the Creek Reservation would be considered intact
under Parker¶VDQDO\VLVWKHUHZDVQRQHHGWRGHFLGH that question if the legal standards in
place prior to Parker dictated a contrary conclusion.
7R EH VXUH WKH 7ULEDO $PLFL¶V SDUDPRXQW GXW\ ZDV QRW WR HQVXUH D IDYRUDEOH
outcome for Mr. Murphy, but to preserve the treaty rights in issue. 18 But there was another
reason the Tribal Amici were hesitant to embrace an interpretation of Parker as upending
pre-Parker caselaw.
The Tenth Circuit had previously decided a case involving reservation rights in
Eastern Oklahoma.19 ,Q D SDUDGLJPDWLF H[DPSOH RI WKH ³GULIW´ E\ ORZHU FRXUWV WRZDUG
Solem¶VVWHS-three mentioned above, the Court, citing City of Sherrill, held that the Osage
Reservation had been disestablished when it was allotted, and based this conclusion largely
on historical assumptions about allotment and WKH ³KHDY\ ZHLJKW´ RI ³MXVWLILDEOH
H[SHFWDWLRQV´RISUHVHQW-day residents, rather than any specific statutory language thought
WR EH VXIILFLHQW WR VLJQDO &RQJUHVV¶V LQWHQW WR GLVHVWDEOLVK WKH UHVHUYDWLRQ 20 Moreover,
Osage Nation did not rely simply on historical assumptions and understandings specific to
WKH 2VDJH 1DWLRQ EXW LQVWHDG FRPPHQWHG LQ GLFWD WKDW LQ SUHSDUDWLRQ IRU 2NODKRPD¶V
VWDWHKRRGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV³KDG already implemented an allotment process with the Five
Civilized Tribes that extinguished national and tribal title to lands within the territory and
GLVHVWDEOLVKHGWKH&UHHNDQGRWKHU2NODKRPDUHVHUYDWLRQV´21
Osage Nation, then, loomed as an inhospitable precedent for the argument that the
Creek Reservation had not in fact been disestablished. If Parker had not intervened, it may
not have been possible to convince the Circuit to hold that the Creek Reservation had
indeed survived allotment. However, arguing that Circuit precedent was incorrect and had
been repudiated by the more recent Supreme Court decision ran a significant risk. The
Supreme Court in Parker did not profess to repudiate any pre-Parker caselaw and indeed
GHVFULEHGWKHEDVLVRILWVDQDO\VLVDV³ZHOOVHWWOHG´ 22 Thus, the Tenth Circuit would have
had credible grounds to find that Osage Nation was undisturbed by Parker, and
accordingly remained controlling in Murphy. By telling the Court that it should reject
Osage Nation as inconsistent with Parker, the Tribal Amici would have been signaling

16. Murphy, 866 F.3d at 1178.
17. 28 U.S.C. 2254 (d)(1).
18. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma at n.2,
Murphy, 866 F.3d 1164 (No. 07-7068) (Tribes took ³no position´ on the procedural issues in Mr. Murphy¶s case).
19. Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2010).
20. See id. at 1124 (³the operative language of the statute does not unambiguously suggest diminishment or
disestablishment of the Osage reservation.´).
21. Id.
22. Parker, 136 S. Ct. at 1072.
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that their arguments could not be squared with Osage Nation. This may have been fatal to
the Reservation rights claims if the Circuit had elected to read Parker as simply a
reaffirmation of settled law.
Still, Parker represented the then high-water mark for precedents recognizing the
preservation of reservation boundaries despite the passage of time and widespread
understanding that those boundaries had long since vanished. To have any chance of
success at all, the Tribal Amici brief needed to embrace Parker to the fullest extent.
However, it was equally necessary to frame Parker as being fully consistent with prior
Supreme Court caselaw and the Circuit precedent developed in reliance on that caselaw.
The brief accordingly described Parker DVDWRQFHEHLQJD³ZDWHUVKHGGHFLVLRQ´EXWRQH
thDW³UHDIILUPHGDQGFODULILHG´WKHGLVHVWDEOLVKPHQWDQDO\VLV 23 This was no contradiction,
because Parker in fact checked both these boxes. Its singular importance lay in the fact
that it emphatically instructed the lower courts to return their primary focus to the textual
factors that Solem and prior disestablishment decisions had emphasized, rather than
hinging decisions on non-textual factors that were originally understood to be of secondary
and tertiary importance.
Happily, the Tenth Circuit saw the world in the same way. In his thoroughly
considered, 126-page opinion for a unanimous panel, Judge Matheson explained that, ³>L@Q
Nebraska v. Parker WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW XQDQLPRXVO\ UHFRPPLWWHG WR WKH µZHOO-VHWWOHG¶
Solem IUDPHZRUN´24 And throughout his opinion, he cited Solem and Osage Nation as
controlling, but consistently did so through the lens of, and with parallel citation to,
Parker.25
B. Supplementing the Record
Another major challenge that the legal team faced related to the record, and more
specifically the lack thereof. Due in no small part to procedural complications in the State
court proceedings, the case reached the Tenth Circuit with virtually no development of the
historical or contemporary evidence bearing on the questions of reservation
disestablishment. While disestablishment is a question of statutory or treaty interpretation,
under Parker, historical context remained significant in determining the meaning of the
relevant text, particularly with respect to the negotiation records of the allotment
agreements and statutes that severed the reservation land base from communal tribal
ownership and documents reflecting how Tribal, federal, and State actors interpreted and
enforced those statutes and agreements in the critical years immediately following
allotment.
Under ideal circumstances, a tribe whose Reservation rights are in issue would be
involved in the case from an early stage and could submit an expert witness report
providing the critical historical evidence and context necessary for the Court to fully
evaluate the meaning the parties to an agreement would have attributed to it at the time.
Unfortunately, reservation boundaries claims are frequently brought by criminal
23. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma, Murphy,
866 F.3d 1164 (No. 07-7068).
24. Murphy, 875 F.3d at 930.
25. See generally id.
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GHIHQGDQWVZKRZLOORUGLQDULO\ODFNWKHWULEDOJRYHUQPHQW¶VXQLTXHSHUVSHFWLYHLQWRWKH
relevant historical context and may not possess the resources to ensure that this evidence
comes into the record. Such was the case in Murphy, where the Nation had not been
involved in those early stages and accordingly submitted no such materials.
Given that the case was already up on appeal, there was no ability to submit a
comprehensive historical report. Accordingly, the legal team in Murphy had to fill in the
JDSVZLWKDYDLODEOHSULPDU\VRXUFHV%DVHGRQWKHDUJXPHQWVEHORZDQGWKHGLVWULFWFRXUW¶V
decision, it was understood that the State would be arguing that the purpose of the federal
JRYHUQPHQW¶VSXUVXLWRIDQDOORWment agreement with the Five Tribes was to set the table
for terminating their sovereign rights and reservation land base. Under Parker and Solem,
WKRXJKLWZDVWKH6WDWH¶VEXUGHQWRVXSSRUWWKLVDUJXPHQWZLWK³XQHTXLYRFDOHYLGHQFH´26
showing that everyone involved²tribal, federal, and affected non-Indian citizens²
understood this to be the case. Fortunately, the historical record was not unequivocal, and
significant evidence existed supporting a contrary historical narrative, one that showed a
Creek Nation (like others of the Five Tribes) unwavering in its commitment to preserving
its sovereignty and treaty rights against immense pressure to relinquish both.
Key sources the team was able to draw on included the accounts from the Dawes
Commission²the negotiation team dispatched by Congress to negotiate with the Five
Tribes for the allotment of their lands in anticipation of Oklahoma Statehood. At first
glance, there was cause for concern that these records could be viewed as supporting the
6WDWH¶VQDUUDWLYH. The Dawes Commission was established by Congress
for the purpose of the extinguishment of the national or tribal title to any lands within [the
Indian] Territory . . . either by cession of the same or some part thereof to the United States,
or by the allotment and division of the same in severalty among the Indians of such nations.27

Taken in isolation and stripped of its historical context, this language could be read
to suggest the very thing that Courts can rely on to find diminishment²an explicit desire
RQ WKH SDUW RI WKH IHGHUDO JRYHUQPHQW WR HIIHFWXDWH DQ ³H[WLQJXLVKPHQW´ RI WKH WULEDO
territorial rights that inhere in reservation status. This is in fact how the State construed
this language in its brief, citing it as one of many CongresVLRQDODFWVGHPRQVWUDWLQJ³FOHDU
DQGXQHTXLYRFDOH[SUHVVLRQVRIOHJLVODWLYHLQWHQW´WRGLVHVWDEOLVKWKH&UHHN5HVHUYDWLRQ28
However, a deeper exploration into the historical record revealed that the history of
WKH'DZHV&RPPLVVLRQ¶VQHJRWLDWLRQVZLWKthe Five Tribes told a far different story. In its
first Annual Report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1894, the Dawes Commission
reported that:
Early interviews . . . satisfied us that the Indians would not, under any circumstances, agree
to cede any portion of their lands to the Government, but would insist that if any agreements
were made for allotment of their lands it should all be divided equally among them . . . .
Finding this unanimity among the people against the cession of any of their lands to the
United States, we abandoned all idea of purchasing any of it and determined to offer them
an equal division of their lands.29

26.
27.
28.
29.

Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072.
Act of March 3, 1893, ch. 209, § 16, 27 Stat. 612.
Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 57±58, Murphy, 866 F.3d 1164 (No. 07-7068).
COMMISSION TO THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES, ANNUAL REPORTS OF 1894, 1895, AND 1896, at 14 (1897).
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Six years later, in its final Report, the Commission confirmed that it had made no
further progress in its efforts to negotiate for the cession of tribal lands and extinguishment
of their rights to those lands:
Had it been possible to secure from the Five Tribes a cession to the United States of the
entire territory at a given price, . . . the duties of the commission would have been
immeasurably simplified . . . When an understanding is had, however, of the great
difficulties which have been experienced in inducing the tribes to accept allotment in
severalty . . . it will be seen how impossible it would have been to have adopted a more
radical scheme of tribal extinguishment, no matter how simple its evolutions.30

These are but a few examples of how the historical record worked to undermine the
conventional historical narrative and demonstrate that the actual experiences of the Tribal
and federal actors living through the historical period in question were quite different than
many unexamined modern assumptions would hold. To be sure, as noted, there was some
KLVWRULFDO HYLGHQFH VXSSRUWLQJ 2NODKRPD¶V GLVHVWDEOLVKPHQt narrative. But evidence of
diminishment had to be unequivocal to hold any sway in the analysis, and it was far from
that here. As the Tenth Circuit concluded in Murphy,
(YHQLIWKH6WDWH¶VHYLGHQFHRIIHUVVRPHVXJJHVWLRQRIDFRQWHPSRUDU\XQGHUVWDQGLQJthat
the Creek Reservation was disestablished, Mr. Murphy and the Creek Nation have
PDUVKDOOHG HYLGHQFH VKRZLQJ DQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKDW WKH 5HVHUYDWLRQ¶V ERUGHUV FRQWLQXHG
The step-two evidence is at most debatable, and we need not parse it further because
ambiguous evidence cannot overcome the missing statutory text at step one. See Hagen, 510
U.S. at 411. ³7KURXJKRXWWKHLQTXLU\ZHUHVROYHDQ\DPELJXLWLHVLQIDYRURIWKH,QGLDQV . .
. .´ 31

B. En Banc Review
The Creek Nation, alas, would not leave the Tenth Circuit with its reservation status
totally unquestioned or unscathed. For while the Circuit denied en banc review, Chief
Judge Tymkovich (who concurred in that denial and was indeed a member of the original
panel) encouraged Supreme Court review, and in decidedly ominous terms.32 He first
TXHVWLRQHG WKH DSSURSULDWHQHVV XQGHU WKH FLUFXPVWDQFHV RI LQVLVWLQJ RQ ³XQHTXLYRFDO´
historical evidence at step two of the Solem framework: ³Supreme Court precedent . . .
requires that evidence of intent to disesWDEOLVKEHµXQHTXLYRFDO>@¶ . . . History, however, is
not always well suited to provide the unequivocal evidence of disestablishment
that Solem requires. Sometimes history is ambiguous, making it impossible to decide
between competing narratives.´33
The Chief Judge then turned to step three: ³This case may present the high-water
mark of de facto disestablishment: the boundaries of the Creek Reservation . . . encompass
a substantial non-Indian population, including much of the city of Tulsa; and Oklahoma
claims the decision will have dramatic consequences for taxation, regulation, and law

30. SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES 9, reprinted in H. Doc.
No. 5, 56th Cong., 2d Sess. (1901) (1900 Commission Report).
31. Murphy, 875 F.3d at 959±60.
32. See id. (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 967.
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enforcement.´34
Thus, where Parker had appeared to stem the drift among courts away from the stepone emphasis on text toward the atextual considerations at steps two and three, the Chief
Judge was urging that, at least in the singular context of Oklahoma, steps two and three
should predominate:
[T]his may be the rare case where the Supreme Court wishes to enhance Steps Two and
Three of Solem if it can be persuaded that the square peg of Solem is ill suited for the round
hole of Oklahoma statehood . . . . In sum, this challenging and interesting case makes a good
candidate for Supreme Court review.35

The Supreme Court accepted that invitation, with the United States taking the rare
VWHS RI OHQGLQJ LWV VXSSRUW WR WKH 6WDWH¶V SHWLWLRQ IRU FHUWLRUDUL HYHQ EHIRUH WKH &RXUW
requested its views.
V.

ROUND ONE AT THE SUPREME COURT: MURPHY

A. Merits Briefing
The State of Oklahoma, represented by specialist, highly experienced counsel in the
6XSUHPH &RXUW ZRXOG SUHVV &KLHI -XGJH 7\PNRYLFK¶V YLHZ RI WKH FDVH ZLWK DOO JXQV
blazing. Its petition for certiorari and its opening brief on the merits placed heavy and
forceful emphasis on the historical evidence that Congress anticipated the demise of the
Creek Nation and its Reservation; and equal or perhaps even greater emphasis on the later
GHPRJUDSKLFWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIWKHDUHDDQGWKHUHVXOWLQJ³PDVVLYHGLVUXSWLRQ´WR³VHWWOHG
H[SHFWDWLRQV´ DQ DIILUPDQFH ZRXOG EULQJ36 ,QGHHG 2NODKRPD¶V SHWLWLRQ IRU FHUWLRUDUL
ZDUQHGWKDWDIILUPLQJWKH7HQWK&LUFXLW¶VGHFLVLRQZRXOG³UHQGHU2NODKRPDDIUDFWXUHG
second-FODVV VWDWH´ DQG LWV PHULWV EULHI RSHQHG ZLWK D KDOI-page color photograph of
downtown Tulsa, Oklahoma, and a declaration that acknowledging the Creek Reservation
ZRXOGEH³UHYROXWLRQDU\´DQG³would shock the 1.8 million residents of eastern Oklahoma
who have universally understood that they reside on land regulated by state government,
QRWE\WULEHV´37 ,QZKDWWKH1DWLRQ¶VWHDPYLHZHGDVDWDFLWFRQFHVVLRQWKDWLWVVWHSRQH
textual argument was its least compelling, Oklahoma placed decidedly less emphasis on
that prong of the Solem framework, and barely mentioned Parker.
7KH 1DWLRQ¶V SUHIHUUHG JURXQG RI FRXUVH ZDV WKH ODZ 7KHUH VLPSO\ ZDV QR
VWDWXWRU\WH[WGLVHVWDEOLVKLQJWKH&UHHN5HVHUYDWLRQ%XW2NODKRPD¶VHPSKDVLVRQVWHSV
two and three of the Solem analysis²and the quality and force with which its narrative
was written²meant that the team could not over-rely on Parker and had to account for
WKH SRVVLELOLW\ WKDW WKH &RXUWZRXOG VKDUH &KLHI -XGJH 7\PNRYLFK¶V DQG 2NODKRPD¶V 
YLHZWKDWWKLVFDVHPDUNHG³WKHKLJK-water mark of de facto GLVHVWDEOLVKPHQW´DQGWKDt
Parker was beside the point.38 This meant that, although Parker SHUPHDWHGWKH1DWLRQ¶V

34. Id. at 967±68.
35. Id. at 967.
36. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Murphy, 866 F.3d 1164 (No. 07-7068); Brief for Petitioner, Murphy,
866 F.3d 1164 (No. 07-7068).
37. See sources cited supra note 36.
38. See Murphy, 875 F.3d at 967 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2020

9

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 56 [2020], Iss. 3, Art. 7

396

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:387

brief, the Nation nevertheless had to devote a significant portion of its sharply limited word
count²much more than it would have had it been confident that Parker was the governing
framework²WRFRXQWHULQJWKH6WDWH¶VVWHSWZRDQGHVSHFLDOO\LWVVWHSWKUHHDUJXPHQWV
7KH 1DWLRQ FRXOG GR VR ZLWK JUHDWHU FRPIRUW JLYHQ WKDW 0U 0XUSK\¶V 6XSUHPH
Court team, consisting of Ms. Ghezzi and the excellent Jenner & Block firm (with a group
headed by former Acting Solicitor General Ian Gershengorn), would devote considerable
attention to textual analysis in its briefing.
With respect to the arguments about modern-GD\FRQVHTXHQFHVWKH1DWLRQ¶VWHDP
quickly concluded that it was important not simply to play defense on the issue (the sky
will not fall if the Nation wins) but to tell an affirmative story about the tremendous
governmental contributions the Nation makes throughout its Reservation area,
contributions that benefit both Nation citizens and non-citizens alike and that would be
MHRSDUGL]HG ZHUH WKH 1DWLRQ¶V JRYHUQPHQWDO DXWKRULW\ WR EH XQGHUPLQHG E\ D
disestablishment holding. The material for this story was well in hand. For while the State
wanted to focus on Tulsa, in the northeastern corner of the Reservation, the vast majority
of the Reservation is rural and, in low-tax Oklahoma, far from amply served by the State
DQG ORFDO JRYHUQPHQWV 7KH &UHHN 1DWLRQ¶V UREXVW JRYHUQPHQWDO DFWLYLWLHV DUH KHQFH
critical: in areas ranging from public safety (with its highly sophisticated Lighthorse police
force) to infrastructure to the running of hospitals and health care clinics to family violence
prevention and counseling, the Nation acts to enhance the safety and welfare of all within
the Reservation borders.39 7KHVHIDFWVWKH1DWLRQ¶VWHDPNQHZZHUHQRWRQHVWKDWZRXOG
be within the normal cognizance of the Court, and they were well worth educating the
Court about.
The Nation was aided immeasurably in countering 2NODKRPD¶V FRXQWHUIDFWXDO
narrative about the consequences of reservation affirmation by stellar amicus briefs filed
by others. The National Congress of American Indians, in a brief authored by Colette
Routel and Bethany Berger, detailed how sizeable non-Indian population centers thrive on
reservations across the country, with reservation status often (as in the case of the Creek
Nation) resulting in considerable benefits for non-Indians as well as tribal members.40
Troy Eid and Jennifer Weddle authored a brief on behalf of former United States Attorneys
(of whom Troy is one) explaining with great authority that Congress is well capable of
addressing any criminal justice issues arising out of continued reservation status, and that
it has done so successfully in other instances.41 The guest editor of this volume, Mary
Kathryn Nagle, joined with Professor Sarah Deer to write a brief for the National
,QGLJHQRXV:RPHQ¶V5HVRXUFH&HQWHU fleshing out for the Court the grave problems with
domestic violence that have arisen across the country where tribal governmental powers
have been handicapped, a point with particular pertinence given the nationally-recognized
HIILFDF\RIWKH1DWLRQ¶VIDPLO\YLROHQFHSUHYHQWLRQSURJUDPV 42 Susan Work and Stacy
39. See Brief Amici Curiae Muscogee (Creek) Nation in Support of Respondent, Carpenter v. Murphy, 139
S. Ct. 626 (2020) (No. 17-1107).
40. See Brief for National Congress of American Indians as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Sharp,
140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107).
41. See Brief Amici Curiae of Former United States Attorneys Troy A. Eid, Barry R. Grissom et al. in Support
of Respondent, Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107).
42. See Brief of Amici Curiae 1DWLRQDO ,QGLJHQRXV :RPHQ¶V 5HVRXUFH &HQWHU DQG $GGLWLRQDO $GYRFDF\
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Leeds authored a brief on behalf of Indian law scholars and historians complementing
QLFHO\ WKH 1DWLRQ¶V KLVWRULFDO GLVFXVVLRQ LQFOXGLQJ ZLWK D EURDGHU GLVFXVVLRQ RI WKH
relevant histories of the other Five Tribes.43
And in what was a truly unique submission, Robert Henry (former Chief Judge of
the Tenth Circuit), Michael Burrage, Steve Greetham, Brad Mallett, and the Sonosky firm
wrote a brief on behalf of the Chickasaw Nation, the Choctaw Nation, and current and
former State of Oklahoma elected officials, including high-ranking officials in State
government and Congressman Tom Cole, a senior member of the House Republican
leadership and co-chair of the Congressional Native Caucus.44 Yes, you read all that
right²a collaborative brief between Indian nations and State officials, which touted the
collaboration between the Five Tribes and the State and local units of government
throughout eastern Oklahoma on a wide variety of issues. It is hard to think of a more
HIIHFWLYHFRXQWHUWRWKH6WDWH¶VOLWLJDWLRQUKHWRULFDERXWGLUHFRnsequences than a brief like
this (and sure enough, it, like several of the other amicus briefs, was cited by Justice
Gorsuch in his eventual opinion for the Court in McGirt).45
By the end of briefing, the case had taken on a binary feel. On one side, the Creek
Reservation would stand if the case were decided with a step-one emphasis on text and
Parker2QWKHRWKHUWKH6WDWHZDVSRXQGLQJWKHSRLQWVDERXW³GLVUXSWLRQ´DQG³VHWWOHG
H[SHFWDWLRQV´WKDWKDGUXOHGWKHGD\LQFDVHVOLNHSherrill, with the Nation pushing back
vigorously while trying to keep the focus, as was Mr. Murphy, on the text. And oral
argument reflected that divide. Justice Gorsuch, who had sat on a Tenth Circuit panel that
KDGDGGUHVVHGDSURFHGXUDOLVVXHSHUWDLQLQJWR0U0XUSK\¶VKDEHDVproceedings, recused
himself when the case reached the Court, leaving eight Justices to decide it. Three of them
focused their questions on the intent of Congress as reflected in statutory text²i.e., step
RQH .DJDQ - ³GLG &RQJUHVV LQ IDFW´ WHUPLQDWH the reservation?); (Sotamayor, J.:
³([DFWO\ZKHQGLG>&RQJUHVV@GRWKLV"´  %UH\HU-WH[WRIVWDWXWH³GRHVQRWVRXQG
OLNHDQDEURJDWLRQ´RIVRYHUHLJQW\ 46 And three of them, through a Sherrill-esque lens,
focused on practical consequences and the disruption of settled expectations: (Alito, J.:
³&RXOG\RXVD\VRPHWKLQJDERXWWKHSUDFWLFDOHIIHFWVRIWKH7HQWK&LUFXLW¶VGHFLVLRQRQ. .
. eastern Oklahoma?´  5REHUWV&-³:RXOGWKLVH[SDQGWKHUHDFK of [gaming] in the
DUHD"´  (.DYDQDXJK-³HYHQLILWZHUH DPELJXRXVRQWKH WH[W . . . we would be . . .
creating a great deal of turmoil. $QGVRZK\VKRXOGQ¶W. . . all the practical implications
VD\ OHDYH ZHOO HQRXJK DORQH KHUH"´ 47 Meanwhile, Justice Ginsburg asked a single,

Organizations for Survivors of Domestic Violence and Assault in Support of Respondent, Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412
(No. 17-1107).
43. See Brief of Amici Curiae Historians, Legal Scholars, and Cherokee Nation in Support of Respondent,
Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107).
44. See Brief of Amici Curiae David Boren, Brad Henry et al. in Support of Respondent, Sharp, 140 S. Ct.
2412 (No. 17-1107).
45. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2499.
46. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4 lns.24±25, Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107); Transcript of Oral
Argument at 20 lns.17±18, Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107); Transcript of Oral Argument at 32 ln.4, Sharp,
140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107).
47. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28 lns.18±22, Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107); Transcript of Oral
Argument at 55 lns.20±25; Transcript of Oral Argument at 56 lns.1±4, Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107);
Transcript of Oral Argument at 72 lns.8±10, Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107).
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largely unrevealing, question;48 and Justice Thomas asked none. It was not lost on the
team that these two reticent Justices were the authors, respectively, of Sherrill and
Parker.49
B. Supplemental Briefing
Given the strong cross-currents at argument, it would have been even more foolish
WKDQXVXDOWRKDYHPDGHSUHGLFWLRQVDERXWRXWFRPHDQGWKH1DWLRQ¶VWHDPVHWWOHGLQIRU
what presumably would be a several-month wait until a decision. But word from the Court
came much sooner than that. Oral argument in Murphy took place on November 27, 2018.
One week later the Court ordered supplemental briefing on two issues:
(1) Whether any statute grants the state of Oklahoma jurisdiction over the prosecution of
crimes committed by Indians in the area within the 1866 territorial boundaries of the Creek
1DWLRQLUUHVSHFWLYHRIWKHDUHD¶VUHVHUYDWLRQVWDWXV  :KHWKHUWKHUHDUHFLUFXPVWDQFHVLQ
which land qualifies as an Indian reservation but nonetheless does not meet the definition of
Indian country as set forth in 18 U. S. C. §1151(a).50

While somewhat dismayed at a personal level by a briefing order that promised to
ZUHDN KDYRF RQ WKH KROLGD\V WKH 1DWLRQ¶V WHDP ZDV SOHDVHG E\ WKH TXHVWLRQV 7KHLU
predicate was continued reservation status. Which meant that the Nation was still very
much alive and in the game.
In the weeks that followed, a few observers raised the question whether it would be
strategically prudent to simply concede that the State has criminal jurisdiction, and in so
doing preserve the broader suite of tribal authority inherent in reservation status. There
were two significant problems with this approach. First, jurisdiction and sovereignty are
not matters of expedience, and the Nation was not willing to engage in horse-trading to
preserve a reservation that, with enough concessions of the sort suggested, would end up
being one in name only. Second, the law provided no credible basis to offer up the
SURSRVHGFRQFHVVLRQ7KH1DWLRQ¶VWHDPVFRXUHGWKHKLVWRULFDOUHFRUGDQGfound no statute
expressly transferring criminal jurisdiction to the State²an express transfer being the
accepted standard for such a fundamental shift in governmental authority. The Nation laid
out its findings for the Court, and this time settled in for a wait that turned out to be much
longer than expected. For when the last day of the Term arrived, the Court announced that
it was holding Murphy over for re-argument.51 :LWKWKLVQHZVWKH1DWLRQ¶VWHDPUHFHLYHG
calls and notes expressing condolences at the lack of a decision. But there was no cause
for consolation. The Nation was still alive. The Court had rung the bell for another round,
and the Nation and all others involved in this epic fight would answer it.
VI. ROUND TWO AT THE SUPREME COURT: MCGIRT
A case that had witnessed its share of unusual developments had one more major
48. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35 lns.11±18, Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107).
49. Sherrill, 544 U.S. 197; Nebraska, 136 S. Ct. 1072.
50. Order for Supplemental Briefs, Murphy, 139 S. Ct. 626 (No. 17-1107).
51. Supreme Court Schedules Tribal Lands Case for Reargument Next Term, ABA (July 1, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/death_penalty_representation/project_press/2019/summer/sup
reme-court-schedules-tribal-lands-case-for-reargument-next-te/.
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one in store. When the Court released its argument calendars for the early months of the
next Term, Murphy was nowhere to be seen.52 The Nation and Murphy teams fairly
quickly surmised that the Court had a new plan in mind: the Court had a number of other
cases in the pipeline in which criminal defendants were challenging their convictions on
the same reservation basis as Mr. Murphy. Some of those cases came out of the State court
system, meaning that they would not raise a recusal issue for Justice Gorsuch. Sure
enough, in December of 2019 the Court granted certiorari in the State court case of Jimcy
McGirt v. State of Oklahoma.53 A nine-justice Court would decide the fate of the Creek
Reservation.
It was natural to think that, in the new proceedings, Justice Gorsuch might act to
break what could have been a 4-4 logjam in Murphy (and that an equally divided Court
had not simply wanted to affirm without an opinion in Murphy due to the historic and
practical significance of the case). That was not necessarily true. The complexities
introduced by the supplemental questions suggested the possibility of other approaches
and coalitions on the Court. But, leaving those nuances aside, it is not surprising that the
new briefs filed by the State, the United States, Mr. McGirt, and the Nation all sought to
GUDZVWUHQJWKIURP-XVWLFH*RUVXFK¶VMXULVSUXGHQFH
Fortunately, this was a much easier fit for the Nation and Mr. McGirt than for the
RWKHUVLGH:LWKLQGD\VRIWKHQHZJUDQWRIFHUWLRUDULWKH1DWLRQ¶VWHDPZDVGHYRXULQJQRW
RQO\-XVWLFH*RUVXFK¶VNH\GHFLVLRQVRQWKH&RXUWDQGWKH7HQWK&LUFXLWEXWalso his book,
A Republic, If You Can Keep It.54 It was happy reading. Several core features of Justice
*RUVXFK¶VDSSURDFKWRWKHODZWKDWZHUHRIFULWLFDOUHOHYDQFHWRWKHUHVHUYDWLRQGLVSXWH
became crystal clear, and they were fully consistent with the cRUHWKHPHRIWKH1DWLRQ¶V
FDVH WKDW RQO\ &RQJUHVV FRXOG KDYHGLVHVWDEOLVKHG WKH 1DWLRQ¶V UHVHUYDWLRQ WKDW LW KDG
nowhere made clear an intent to do so, and that subsequent events (including a brazen
GLVUHJDUGIRUWKH1DWLRQ¶VULJKWV DQGSUHGLFWLRQVRIGire consequences could not substitute
for Congressional action.55 Perhaps most importantly, the extent to which Justice Gorsuch
is a fervent believer in the separation of powers and its critical role in sustaining our
republic infused his book and opinions. His commitment to maintaining a proper respect
for the coordinate branches of government applies forcefully to the field of Indian affairs,
ZKHUHKHKDVPDGHLWFOHDUWKDWWKH&RXUWVKRXOGUHVSHFW&RQJUHVV¶VSULPDF\5HODWHGO\
Justice Gorsuch is of course a strict textualist, hewing faithfully to the language of treaties
and statutes, and has made plain his view that the courts should not depart from textual
conclusions favoring the tribes because of dire predictions about the consequences of
doing so. His writings also demonstrated that he is a keen student of history, and that,
perhaps in part because of his western roots, he has an understanding that Tribes, States,
and local governments can work well together, and that inter-governmental cooperation
rather than domination is in the best interests of all citizens.
$OOWKHVHIHDWXUHVRI-XVWLFH*RUVXFK¶VDSSURDFKWRWKHODZDUHHYLGHQWLQWKHRSLQLRQ

52. Calendars and Lists: Session Beginning October 7, 2019, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/calendarsandlists.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2021).
53. Order Granting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, McGirt, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (No. 18-9526).
54. NEIL GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT (Crown Forum ed., 2019).
55. See generally id.
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that he ultimately penned for the Court.56 Many of the infringements on tribal sovereignty
over the last few decades have resulted from courts imposing their views as to what the
limitations on tribal sovereignty should be, rather than respecting the will of Congress.
Justice Gorsuch refused to travel that road, and along with others on the Court, including
especially Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, his deep interest in and fidelity to fundamental
SULQFLSOHVRIIHGHUDO,QGLDQODZLVDIIHFWLQJDQLPSRUWDQWVKLIWLQWKH&RXUW¶VDSSURDFKWR
Indian law cases.
VII. CONCLUSION
$VPHPEHUVRIWKH1DWLRQ¶VOLWLJDWLRQWHDPZHIHHOEOHVVHGWRKDYHSOD\HGDVPDOO
UROHLQYLQGLFDWLQJWKHFUHDWLRQDQGFRQWLQXHGH[LVWHQFHRIWKH1DWLRQ¶V5HVHUYDWLRQ:H
are deeply appreciative of the contributions of so many to the legal effort, and above all
else remain in awe of the sheer determination and force of will that have enabled the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation and its people not only to endure but to flourish anew.

56. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2499.
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